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HONG KONG is widely perceived as a quintessentially capitalist 
society whose members channel in a single-minded fashion their 
considerable energies and talents towards strictly materialistic goals. 
Arguably, however, this perception no longer fully corresponds to 
political reality. Whether through a process of natural evolution, or 
as a result of several painful shocks administered by the People's 
Republic of China, most notably the events of Tiananmen Square in 
June 1989, local people have grown increasingly assertive and more 
willing to resort to confrontational tactics in pursuit of their interests 
and values. 
While there is reluctance in Beijing, London, and the corridors of 
bureaucratic power in the territory to acknowledge this change, Hong 
Kong residents are not only responding keenly to opportunities spawned 
by the gradual political reform process but attempting to stretch the 
limits of quasi-democracy when strategic issues are at stake. One 
should not perhaps exaggerate this trend, yet it is evident that an 
attitudinal quantum leap has taken place and that the community is 
more conscious than ever of its rights and capabilities. 
Given the shift from passive to active politics, it is reasonable to 
assume that the question of freedom of assembly will assume even 
greater importance in the future. Indeed, one of the aims of the present 
chapter is to speculate about likely government responses to the 
changing socio-political circumstances and to suggest possible 
legislative reforms. One cannot, however, proceed to deal with future 
contingencies without a discussion of past and present trends — 
particularly in Hong Kong where policy tends to evolve incrementally 
over a long period of time. Therefore observations about the 
future are preceded by a brief historical survey and a detailed analysis 
of the existing law. 
A. Historical Background 
Perhaps the most significant turning-point in the history of legislation 
pertaining to the freedom of assembly in Hong Kong was the year 
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1967, in which there was an attempt to 'consolidate and amend the 
law relating to the maintenance of public order, the control of or-
ganizations, meetings, places, vessels and aircraft, unlawful assemblies 
and riots and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith'.1 The 
same year was also marked by the worst civil unrest that Hong Kong 
has experienced and, consequently, the Public Order Bill 1967 
encountered little opposition, passing swiftly and with only a few 
minor amendments. In view of the strong emphasis placed by the 
Bill's presenters on 'prevention and control of disorder' while avoiding 
any reference to the right of members of the public to dissent or express 
their opinions by means of peaceful assembly, it is particularly 
noteworthy that no fundamental objections were raised. The Bill was 
projected as a measure erring on the side of safety and justified as a 
necessary response to the turmoil experienced in the preceding months.2 
In an effort to deflect potential criticisms, the government signalled 
that if the 'balance between citizen and state' changed or the 
implementation of the Bill disclosed 'gaps or provisions which proved 
unfair or oppressive', it would be 'ready and willing to consider 
suitable amendment'.3 Such an opportunity presented itself in 1970 
with the enactment of the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 
following the 'recognition that some of the provisions of the Ordinance 
confer unnecessarily wide powers in ordinary times and that, in a few 
instances, there may be a risk that innocent persons may become 
involved in offences'.4 The 'need for [further] review of the provisions 
of the Public Order Ordinance [specifically]5 relating to public meetings 
and processions in the light of [new] circumstances' was acknowledged 
again nine years later.6 
As indicated, the main purpose of the architects of the 1967 
Ordinance was that of 'strengthening the law dealing with public 
order'. To this end, they conferred wide powers on the relevant 
executive organs. Thus, the Commissioner of Police was granted the 
authority to prohibit the holding or continuance of any public gathering 
in any particular area or premises or on any particular day if he 
considers it necessary or expedient in the interests of public order to 
do so (section 15); the Governor in Council was provided with the 
power to ban all public gatherings for up to three months if he considers 
it necessary to do so in order to prevent serious public disorder (section 
16); a police officer of or above the rank of inspector was authorized 
to prevent the holding of, stop or disperse, or vary the place or route 
of any public meeting, public procession, or public gathering other 
than meetings exclusively for religious purposes (section 3); authority 
412 HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 
was also extended to such an officer to enter and search premises 
without warrant, search persons found in premises, and stop and search 
vessels and vehicles in which such an officer knows or has reasons 
to suspect that there is evidence of an offence under the ordinance 
(section 49); all police officers of any rank were given the power to 
prevent the holding of, and to stop or disperse an unlicensed public 
meeting or public procession (section 11); and their coercive ability 
was further buttressed by an array of ancillary powers such as the 
authority to issue orders and use necessary force (section 11); finally, 
section 50(1) accorded members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police 
Force on duty greater powers and immunities than they had previously 
held, placing them on a par with police officers of equivalent ranks. 
Nor was it just a matter of enhancing the control potential of law 
enforcement officers. The Public Order Ordinance 1967 also 
substantially expanded the scope of relevant offences to replace what 
had been regarded as the 'technical and ill adapted' and generally 
'inadequate' common law on the subject of unlawful assembly and 
riot.7 To be more explicit, according to the Ordinance (section 18), 
if three or more persons assembled together conducted themselves in 
a manner intended or likely to cause anybody reasonably to fear a 
breach of the peace, regardless of whether they shared a 'common 
purpose', they would constitute an 'unlawful assembly'. The latter, 
in turn, would amount to a riot as soon as any party present committed 
a breach of the peace (section 19). Furthermore, an unlawful assembly 
might be deemed an 'intimidating' one under the new provisions 
(sections 27-30) which introduced into the permanent law the substance 
of the Emergency (Prevention of Intimidation) Regulations 1967. 
As the impact of the 1967 disturbances started to dissipate, criticism 
intensified against powers granted to the police that were deemed to 
be 'unnecessary' or 'unjustifiable', and the likelihood of 'morally 
innocent persons'8 falling within the broad terms in which some 
sections in the Public Order Ordinance were expressed. While admitting 
no actual abuse of the powers conferred by the Ordinance or the 
unreasonable prosecution or wrong conviction of persons, the 
government proceeded to 'clarify some provisions about which doubt 
has been expressed and to relax others in order to give better protection 
to the public against any misuse of powers or against the possible 
conviction of persons innocently involved in circumstances which 
constitute offences under the Ordinance'.9 
Specifically, the term 'meeting' was redefined to include any 
meetings in which a degree of organization is exhibited, whether 
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before or during the meeting, thus excluding a casual gathering of 
persons in a public place, hitherto regarded as a meeting subject to 
the requirement of a licence. Also excluded were meetings for any 
statutory purpose, such as creditors' meetings or sittings of courts. 
Exempted additionally10 from the need to obtain a licence were 
meetings held for social or business purposes in licensed restaurants 
and funeral meetings. Amendments were introduced not only to narrow 
the ambit of the Ordinance's application but also to restrict the exercise 
by police officers of the power to prevent the holding, stopping, and 
dispersing of public meetings (section 11), as well as the powers to 
prohibit the public display of flags and banners (section 3) to occasions 
where these could be believed to be reasonably necessary (rather than 
on the basis of the officer's opinion). Similarly curtailed were the 
wide powers of search and entry granted to police officers under the 
1967 Ordinance (section 49); they retained merely the qualified 
authority to require a person to identify himself if this was considered 
necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting a crime. 
Perhaps even more significant was the attempt to circumscribe the 
liabilities and offences under the Ordinance. In such a vein, the strict 
obligation imposed on the licensee to be present from the first assembly 
of the meeting to its final dispersal was amended to enable him the 
defence of absence by reason of illness or other unavoidable cause. 
By the same token, a person responsible for the organization, 
promotion, direction, or management of a meeting which was 
prohibited by the Commissioner of Police under section 15 would, 
under the new provisions, be guilty of an offence only after the issue 
of the prohibition order. The defence of 'lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse' was also guaranteed by the 1970 amendment to 'participants' 
(as distinct from organizers) charged with taking part in an unlicensed 
assembly (section 12) who could demonstrate that they had been 
innocent bystanders and had become involved unintentionally. The 
plea of lawful authority or reasonable excuse was extended in like 
manner to persons charged with having an offensive weapon in their 
possession at a public meeting or procession (section 14), in the light 
of the wide definition of 'offensive weapon' which includes articles 
that are in common use (such as choppers or knives). Of particular 
importance were the amendments of the offences of unlawful assembly 
(section 18) and riot (section 19), requiring a disorderly, intimidating, 
insulting, or provocative element in the conduct of an assembly before 
it became unlawful. As a result of these amendments, the offence of 
'intimidating assembly' became superfluous, since a person taking 
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part in an intimidating assembly could be prosecuted for taking part 
in an unlawful one. 
The attempt of 1970 to strike a better balance between the values 
of public authority and individual liberty notwithstanding, the 
implementation of the provisions in the Public Order Ordinance 
which imposed constraints on freedom of assembly continued to 
provoke criticism, the most grave of which entailed allegations of 
the arbitrary exercise of police power and selective enforcement of 
the law.11 A series of events in 197912 and, in particular, an important 
Supreme Court judgment13 served to highlight the anomalies within 
the existing legislation and appear to have prompted the government 
to convene a working party (in May 1979) with a view to 
recommending possible refinements and improvements in the law 
relating to the licensing and control of public meetings and 
processions.14 The working party's efforts culminated the next year 
in the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1980 which sought 
primarily to replace the established licensing procedures pertaining 
to public meetings with a simplified system of police notification in 
the context of substantially redefined 'meetings' and 'processions', 
thus arguably paving the way for a variety of public meetings to be 
held without official permission. 
The shift towards a less sweeping form of monitoring public 
meetings was justified by the government on the ground that there 
was a 'sufficiently stable' Hong Kong with a 'sufficiently responsible' 
population.15 Be that as it may, the further liberalization of the law 
undertaken in 1980 was still heavily influenced by considerations of 
public order and security. The then Attorney General shed light on 
the cautious attitude displayed by the authorities more than a decade 
after the eruption of the 1967 disturbances by portraying the territory 
as a potentially volatile place. As he put it in a statement to the 
Legislative Council: 
Although Hong Kong today is stable, and its population, with very few 
exceptions, responsible it was not always so, and — who knows — in the 
future issues unforeseen by us today may arise which could lead to the 
expression of strongly opposing views supported perhaps by different groups 
or different factions in society. And it is to be remembered too that in all 
societies and in all places it happens sometimes that those who hold strong 
and controversial views may, through misguided enthusiasm or indeed 
sometimes perhaps through malice, attempt to insist upon the expression of 
their views in places and at times when to do so may risk or even be actually 
designed to cause unrest.16 
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Given the lingering fear that the communication of opinions in the 
public domain poses the danger of escalating into political conflict 
and destabilizing the precarious social order, the importance of the 
'right to demonstrate' as an integral part of the freedom of expression 
was — again — not accorded full recognition by local lawmakers in 
1980. In this respect, the latter have not departed from the British 
tradition which denies a positive legal principle supporting the right 
to demonstrate and gives greater weight to the imperatives of political 
order.17 However, even in jurisdictions in which no such denial prevails, 
some form of regulation of public meetings and processions is 
considered legitimate. The specific regulatory measures adopted by 
the Hong Kong government are therefore of interest, despite the 
intellectual rejection of the right to demonstrate in principle. These 
measures and the law which incorporates them are described and 
evaluated in the following section. 
B. Survey of Existing Legal Provisions 
The local authorities have opted to regulate the freedom of assembly 
in the territory by a variety of means ranging from 'prior restraint', 
through 'subsequent punishment', to 'dispersal powers'. The first 
type of measure includes three 'pre-assembly' methods of vetting 
made available under the Public Order Ordinance, namely, licensing, 
notification, and banning orders.18 
1. Regulation by Prior Restraint 
a. Licensing 
The licensing procedure is detailed in section 13 of the Public Order 
Ordinance which stipulates that public processions consisting of more 
than 20 people and taking place on public highways, public 
thoroughfares, or public parks must be authorized by a licence issued 
in writing by the Commissioner of Police. The licence — once given 
— is subject to such conditions relating to the forming, conduct, route, 
times of passing and dispersal of the procession as the Commissioner 
of Police may impose, as well as a general condition that the licensee 
be 'present at the public procession from the first assembly thereof 
to the final dispersal thereof in order to ensure the 'due performance 
and compliance with the conditions of the licence and the maintenance 
of public order throughout the period of assembly, conduct, and 
dispersal of the public procession' (section 15). Furthermore, the 
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Commissioner of Police enjoys wide discretionary power to grant or 
withhold the necessary permit and is guided merely by the elastic 
formula that he be 'satisfied that the public procession is not likely 
to prejudice the maintenance of public order or to be used for any 
unlawful purpose'. The Commissioner may thus refuse a licence to 
hold a public procession, unless for the sole purpose of a funeral, and 
is constrained in this respect only to the extent that '[t]he applicant 
or any person or society associated directly or indirectly with the 
application or likely in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police to 
be concerned with the organizing, convening, forming or conduct of 
the public procession has, in relation to any public gathering, at any 
time contravened the provisions of [the Public Order Ordinance] or 
any other law or any other condition of a licence, issued under [the] 
Ordinance or any other law'; or that 'the public procession has been 
advertised or otherwise publicized prior to the determination of the 
application' (section 13(6)). 
A right of appeal to the Governor is none the less granted (under 
section 16) to an aggrieved person whose application for a licence is 
rejected or whose licence is cancelled or amended. On the other hand, 
a procession to which the licensing requirement applies, and which 
is held without a licence or in breach of its terms, is deemed to be an 
'unauthorized assembly' and the organizers and participants alike are 
guilty of an offence (section 17A). 
b. Notification 
The notification requirement applies under the present system to public 
meetings which involve — or are expected to involve — more than 
30 people in a public place or more than 200 people in private premises, 
excluding, however, meetings held in schools or accredited educational 
establishments with the consent of the management (section 7). Failure 
to give such notification renders the meeting 'unauthorized' and carries 
with it criminal liability and a heavy penalty (section 17A). By contrast, 
meetings preceded by a notification in accordance with the prescribed 
procedure — that is, seven working days in advance and providing 
the Commissioner of Police with full details — may take place, 
although subject to strict conditions (section 11). The freedom to hold 
public meetings is further circumscribed by the extensive powers 
granted to the Commissioner of Police to prohibit intended meetings 
notice of which has been given (section 9), though section 16 provides 
for a right of appeal to the Governor to rescind the prohibition order. 
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c. Banning Orders 
The Hong Kong authorities have at their disposal banning powers 
both of a general and a specific nature. Thus, a general ban on all, or 
a class, of public gatherings in the territory for a period not exceeding 
three months may be imposed by the Governor in Council 'if he is 
satisfied that by reason of particular circumstances existing in Hong 
Kong or in any part thereof, it is necessary for the prevention of serious 
public disorder' (section 17E). In addition, the Commissioner of Police 
is empowered to place a specific ban on public gatherings 'if it appears 
to him to be necessary or expedient in the interests of public order so 
to do' and regardless of whether the gathering is disorderly or violent 
(section 17D). 
2. Subsequent Punishment 
Tight control over public assemblies may also be exercised in the 
territory through provisions regulating the conduct of participants. 
The principal legal tool of controlling conduct is section 18 of the 
Public Order Ordinance which defines the offence of 'unlawful 
assembly' as the assembly together of three or more persons who 
conduct themselves in a 'disorderly, insulting or provocative manner 
intended or likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the 
persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by 
such conduct provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace'. 
More disruptive forms of assembly are dealt with by invoking the 
offence of 'riot' (section 19), which may be described as any unlawful 
assembly turned violent. Also subject to prosecution under the 
Ordinance (section 26) is a person who 'without lawful authority, at 
any public gathering makes any statement or behaves in a manner 
which is intended or which he knows or ought to know is likely to 
incite or induce any person' to engage in acts of violence. More specific 
restrictions are imposed in the Public Order (Public Meetings) (General 
Conditions) Order 1981 with regard to the duty to maintain good order 
at a public meeting; the requirement to notify the date, location, and 
duration of the meeting; the use of amplification devices; the display 
of banners; advertising arrangements; the burning of national emblems; 
the collection of money; stage performance; the removal of litter at 
the conclusion of meetings; and the dispersal of crowds. 
Another cluster of offences which reinforces the punishment system 
directed at restraining public gatherings concerns picketing. Thus, 
while it is 'lawful for one or more persons, acting on their behalf or 
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on behalf of a registered trade union or of an individual employer or 
firm, in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at 
or near a place where a person works or carries on business, if they 
so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or com-
municating information or of peacefully persuading any person to 
work or abstain from working', it is an offence to 'so attend in such 
numbers, or otherwise in such manner, as to be calculated to intimidate 
any person in that place or to obstruct the approach thereto or egress 
therefrom or to lead to a breach of the peace' (section 46, Trade Unions 
Ordinance).19 Indeed, such a gathering would under the same ordinance 
be tantamount to 'watching and besetting' of that place, conduct which 
constitutes the offence of 'intimidation and annoyance' (section 47). 
The array of punitive measures that may be employed by the Hong 
Kong authorities to enjoin public assemblies is further buttressed by 
statutes proscribing public nuisances,20 obstruction of public places,21 
incitement to disaffection,22 criminal damage to property,23 or 
obstruction of police officers in the execution of their duty,24 and 
supplemented by common law offences25 and statutory instruments.26 
3. Dispersal Powers 
Considerable dispersal powers have been conferred upon police officers 
(in the case of both lawful and unlawful gatherings) if they reasonably 
believe that such activities are 'likely to cause or lead to a breach of 
the peace' (section 17, Public Order Ordinance). In addition, to facilitate 
the enforcement of dispersal orders, police officers may use such force 
'as may reasonably be necessary' to enter any premises in which 
persons are gathered or to close specific places to the public (section 
17). Failure to comply with dispersal orders is a criminal offence 
which is severely penalized (section 17A). 
C. Evaluation 
There is a dearth of judicial pronouncements on the subject of freedom 
of assembly in Hong Kong. Thus an assessment of the extent to which 
this freedom is preserved must inevitably focus primarily on statutory 
provisions and government policy reflected in them. The criteria of 
evaluation, however, mirror international norms and legal practice in 
other jurisdictions. Equipped with such external yardsticks, but not 
without regard to local conditions, one may endeavour to ascertain 
the appropriateness and justiciability of the limits imposed on the 
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exercise of the freedom of assembly in the territory, and particularly 
whether it exists only in so far as the regulating authorities allow it 
to exist. 
At the outset, reference should be made to international guarantees 
of the freedom of assembly which are applicable in Hong Kong. Of 
special relevance here are Article 20 of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,27 which states that '[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association', and Article 21 of the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,28 which 
stipulates that '[t]he right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized'. 
This right, however, is not absolute and it is acknowledged that 
restrictions may be imposed which are 'necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others'.29 The key issue, 
therefore, is the proper balance between competing rights, interests, 
and values, or, more specifically, to reconcile the inherent conflict30 
between the freedom of individuals to attend public meetings or 
participate in public processions on the one hand, and societal needs 
for peace and order, on the other. 
Achieving such a balance often eludes government decision-makers, 
for they tend to gravitate towards the public security and public order 
end of the value spectrum, thereby stifling individual freedom. Indeed, 
as the preceding survey of the law in the territory suggests, the Hong 
Kong bureaucracy has displayed a disquieting proclivity to seek to 
minimize environmental disturbances at the possible cost of impeding 
individual expression. While the authorities pay lip service to the 
ideal of striking a 'fair balance' between these competing rights, the 
right to a stable environment31 invariably carries greater weight. 
Whether a fair balance is struck depends in the first instance on the 
mechanism adopted for the regulation of public gatherings. It is possible 
to argue, for example, that prior restraint of any kind dilutes to a 
certain extent the freedom of assembly. On the other hand, some form 
of prior restraint may be necessary to ensure proper control of traffic 
and allow optimal deployment of traffic control resources. Early notice 
may also be necessary whenever complex decisions concerning 
priorities between competing public uses are faced.32 The key issue, 
therefore, is not the justiciability of prior restraint as such but the 
appropriateness of the specific method employed for this purpose. 
As outlined previously, the procedures devised by the Hong Kong 
government encompass a wide range of prior restraint measures, some 
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aspects of which appear acceptable, or even essential, but which tend 
on the whole to restrict excessively freedom of assembly in the territory. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous restraining technique applied locally 
is the licensing of public processions. While possibly facilitating more 
efficient traffic planning, and reassuring 'risk averters' who may 
prefer to have prior knowledge of the areas within which they can 
operate without exposing themselves to the risk of committing traffic 
or similar offences, the licensing system inhibits the freedom of 
expression and discourages those who may be seeking public channels 
through which to exercise their voice option and are willing to risk 
the consequences. 
In general, the 'costs' associated with mandatory licensing schemes 
of the type relied upon in Hong Kong are thought to outweigh the 
benefits. Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, subjecting the right to 
peaceful assembly to the requirement of a licence substantially devalues 
that right and reduces it to a limited privilege granted at the discretion 
of the authorities. More tangible costs are identified by Baker in his 
recent study.33 They include a cost in the form of what amounts to a 
proscription of valuable means of expressive conduct such as 
'spontaneous' demonstrations.34 Another concrete cost imposed by 
licensing systems manifests itself in the notion of being 'licensed to 
demonstrate', a notion which implies State paternalism, or what Baker 
refers to as 'compelled symbolic affirmation of allegiance'. Strong 
exception is taken particularly to the fact that 'government requires 
the permit in order to do what one already has a right to do'35 and that 
licensing 'forces ... dissidents to acknowledge, by requiring them to 
act out, the authority and dominance of the very government against 
which they protest'.36 An even more significant cost attributed to 
licensing procedures is their vulnerability to arbitrary or biased 
decision-making on the part of the officials involved. According to 
one writer, 'common experience is sufficient to show that [licensers'] 
attitudes, drives, emotions and impulses all tend to carry them to 
excesses' .37 Baker adds that licensing methods are often used to harass 
and suppress dissidents and other advocates of minority opinions 
unacceptable to the authorities or the mainstream community.38 The 
institutional dynamics in which licensing is embedded also tend to 
encourage officials to circumscribe the rights of unpopular groups. 
('Saying "yes" creates more trouble, more work, potential problems, 
and accompanying criticisms.')39 
It could be argued that the record of the police shows a propensity 
towards granting approval to applications for licences.40 Be that as it 
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may, the relatively modest number of applications may in itself be 
indicative of the repressive nature of licensing, and the existing scheme 
remains open to potential abuses. Such abuses cannot be ruled out 
since the present system lacks built-in safeguards against violations 
of civil liberties.41 
The lack of safeguards is not the only questionable feature of the 
licensing procedures. Equally problematic is the provision under 
which a procession held without a licence or in breach of its terms is 
deemed an 'unauthorized assembly' rendering any participant guilty 
of an offence. Given that the law requires those who desire to hold, 
organize, and convene a procession to apply for a permit, fairness 
dictates that the sanction for non-compliance be directed against such 
people alone. 
Similar objections may be raised in relation to another form of 
'prior restraint' currently applied in Hong Kong with respect to public 
meetings, namely, notification. Like licensing, it also has the 
undesirable effect of placing the onus on the person wishing to exercise 
his right to assemble, and does not allow for the possibility of semi-
organized or spontaneous protest. In addition, the far-reaching decision 
to make a failure to notify the Commissioner of Police of the intention 
to hold a public meeting a criminal offence subject to a heavy penalty 
is hardly compatible with liberal notions of freedom of assembly and 
association; nor is there any tangible evidence to suggest that it is 
conducive to the promotion of the objectives normally served by 
criminal law. As Fisse and Jones have contended, 'demonstrations of 
highly radical persuasion are unlikely to be influenced, and may even 
favour the creation of new targets of disobedience'.42 
Furthermore, while an argument could possibly be put forward in 
support of some form of notification, under specific conditions, with 
regard to 'moving assemblies' or processions,43 no such argument 
may legitimately be offered where the problem of allocating scarce 
resources to competing uses does not arise and the mass movement 
of people does not take place (that is, where no police supervision is 
required). The instrumental value of notification is also dubious, for 
the police tend to learn about most public gatherings through informal 
channels such as their own intelligence network and prior publicity, 
which calls into question the practical need for imposing a statutory 
objection to notify the authorities unless the purpose is to cause 
'embarrassment to law abiding citizens'.44 
Equally questionable are banning orders whose statutory rationale 
is not grounded in actual disorderly or violent behaviour, but in the 
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subjective belief of the Commissioner of Police that it is 'necessary 
or expedient in the interests of public order'. Although broadly similar 
banning orders exist in other jurisdictions — for example, some 
European countries have adopted banning procedures in conjunction 
with a notification requirement for the purpose of restraining unruly 
processions — they generally do not apply to gatherings other than 
processions, are reserved for circumstances involving serious public 
disorder which the authorities are ill-equipped to contain, and are 
drafted with a view to minimizing abuses.45 Even the banning powers 
granted under British legislation, which have attracted considerable 
criticism, are confined to processions, and are contingent on the 
inability of the police to prevent serious public disorder by means of 
control mechanisms that enable the attachment of specific conditions 
as to time, area, and route.46 
While the British system is marginally superior to the local one in 
so far as banning is concerned, it constitutes an inadequate model in 
that its 'blanket' nature has apparently inspired Hong Kong lawmakers 
to confer upon the Governor in Council the authority to impose general 
bans on public gatherings in the territory. The lack of discrimination 
between peaceful and violent assemblies is particularly disturbing in 
this respect, because the powers at issue extend to public gatherings 
of any type, strengthen unduly the capacity of the Governor in Council 
to exercise political control, and leave limited scope for judicial review. 
In addition to the problems stemming from reliance on mechanisms 
such as licensing, notification, and banning orders, the local system 
for regulating public gatherings exhibits deficiencies that may be 
attributed to the fact that the standards which feature in the relevant 
provisions are very elastic and place too much discretion in the hands 
of the decision-making body. As indicated, the 'maintenance' of public 
order or the 'interests of public order' may justify the Commissioner 
of Police in refusing to permit the holding of public meetings or to 
grant a licence for a procession, and can provide him with sufficient 
grounds to prohibit any public gathering. No systematic attempt is 
made to formally delineate or carefully define the conditions under 
which such restrictions on the freedom of assembly may be imposed. 
An insight into the government's perception of the notion of 
'public/good order' has recently been provided in the Hong Kong 
Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.47 Listed 
therein are the 'main factors which the Commissioner of Police will 
take into account'. These include most questionable considerations, 
such as speculation with respect to the participants' state of mind or 
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY 423 
feelings ('so concerned, so angry or so volatile that there is a danger 
that emotions will take over so the participants lose control of 
themselves and riot') and the vulnerability to the disruptive tactics of 
opposing groups.48 The legitimacy of such considerations aside, they 
are not comprehensive in nature, nor do they offer a coherent 
framework for preventing abuse and arbitrary application. 
Another problematic factor which enters into local regulatory 
decisions concerning freedom of assembly pertains to the past 
behaviour of potential organizers. Thus, if a person or a collective 
body associated with the organization of a public meeting has been 
convicted of an offence under the Public Order Ordinance, this 
conviction allows the Commissioner of Police to proscribe the holding 
of such a meeting. An even greater power is given to the Commissioner 
in the exercise of his discretion in the context of public processions, 
authorizing him to deny a licence to applicants who have at any time 
violated provisions of any law or permit relating to public gatherings. 
The unfairness inherent in depriving persons of the freedom to voice 
their views publicly in an organized manner on account of the prior 
conviction of the leaders of the planned event has been emphasized 
by several writers.49 Their criticism is rooted in the assumption that 
the past conduct of organizers is merely one of several variables which 
impinge on the outcome, peaceful or otherwise, of group activity, and 
that it is not a particularly reliable predictor in this respect. They also 
express misgivings about the denial of civil liberties to persons who 
have already suffered punishment for their unlawful conduct. 
The employment of ill-defined and dubious standards is not confined 
to 'pre-gathering' measures alone, but also extends to the regulation 
of gatherings 'in progress'. Considerable ambiguity, for instance, 
characterizes the 'breach of the peace' criterion which guides decisions 
regarding the public display of objects such as flags in gatherings, 
police powers to stop and disperse, and the offences of disorder in a 
public place, unlawful assembly, and riot. No definition of the concept 
of 'breach of the peace' is provided in any ordinances, nor is it in fact 
possible to find a 'modern and authoritative definition' in English 
and Commonwealth jurisprudence.50 Moreover, '[t]he quest for an 
all-embracing definition might, perhaps, be an illusory one.' For 'what 
amounts to a breach of the peace sufficient to justify or require a 
policeman's prophylactic intervention in one context (rowdiness on 
the streets after a party) might be of a different order from the threats 
to the peace that can be tolerated in the course of a picket or 
demonstration.'51 The multidimensional nature of the concept of 
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'breach of the peace' has been highlighted by Bevan,52 who has 
attributed to it at least five different shades of meaning, each with 
different ramifications in so far as the freedom of association and 
assembly is concerned. To illustrate, if the notion of 'breach of the 
peace' is interpreted to encompass any public disturbance, police 
officers in Hong Kong may be permitted to prevent public gatherings 
merely on the ground that would-be speakers might express views 
likely to offend some listeners or that their noisy behaviour could 
disrupt the tranquillity of the neighbourhood. Indeed, an interpretation 
along these lines is likely to be favoured by the Hong Kong decision-
makers who have construed a related amorphous term, 'good order', 
as involving the issue of 'whether the views the participants wish to 
express are so unpopular that those opposing them may wish to mount 
a counter-demonstration with the possibility of conflict between the 
two sides ensuing' ,53 
Such an approach — in the absence under the Public Order Ordinance 
of any distinctions with respect to the source of disturbance — fails 
to give recognition to the fundamental democratic principle that under 
normal circumstances54 the right to assemble freely should never be 
revoked or controlled because of threatened violence by unreceptive 
spectators.55 It is furthermore inconsistent with the duty imposed on 
governments to ensure that peaceful protests can proceed without 
disruption.56 
Nor is it desirable to make criminal liability for offences such as 
lawful assembly and riot largely dependent on an ambiguous concept 
like 'breach of the peace' and the mere likelihood that some people 
might be stirred into hostile reaction. As Bevan contended, the key 
element in ascribing criminal liability in the context of freedom of 
expression must be intention on the part of the speaker to incite violence 
or recklessness. The law should 'only punish the speaker who 
intentionally or recklessly sets out to provoke violence whilst acquitting 
the speaker whose opponents are the real source of disorder' ,57 At the 
same time, the use of 'fighting words' which 'by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace'58 
may engage the speaker in criminal activity subject to punishment. 
The existing legal provisions in the territory with regard to disorder 
in public places and unlawful assembly, although incorporating some 
reference to intention, omit the critical elements of the imminence 
and seriousness of the anticipated violence, placing excessive 
discretionary power in the hands of the police and injecting ambiguity 
into a domain which is in need of certainty. 
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The problem is compounded by the fact that the objects of regulation 
themselves, namely, meetings and processions, are not carefully 
defined. Consequently, borderline cases may proliferate, further 
detracting from the value of the law as a mechanism for reducing 
uncertainty. It is not clear, for instance, which issues qualify as 'matters 
of interest or concern to the general public or a section thereof in 
relation to public meetings.59 Similarly, the loose expression 'common 
purpose' which furnishes the basis for the definition of procession60 
can hardly be said to promote clarity. 
The deficiencies of the present legislation do not manifest themselves 
in the prevalence of ambiguous phrases alone. Another factor is the 
appropriateness of the vesting of public officials with such an extensive 
authority to make crucial decisions concerning the freedom of 
assembly. As Lord Scarman noted, '[a]t the end of the day standards 
of police conduct and the proper use by the police of their powers 
mean more to society than the theoretical state of the law'.61 In his 
view, the answer lies in better organization, accountability, training, 
and supervision of the police,62 but the question still remains as to 
whether police officers should exercise such wide-ranging controls 
over the freedom of assembly in Hong Kong. It is, for instance, 
legitimate to query whether police officers whose principal function 
is the maintenance of peace and order are likely to be sufficiently 
sensitive to the importance of citizens' rights to peaceful assembly. 
Furthermore, there is a danger that the Commissioner of Police, given 
his prominent position within the executive branch of government, 
may be subject to improper political influences in discharging his 
responsibilities as the official controlling public gatherings. 
The great latitude enjoyed by police officers is of particular concern 
to civil libertarians in the territory in view of the fact that no neutral, 
non-political, independent reviewing body is assigned to check police 
discretion. The Hong Kong legislation provides for appeals against 
refusals to allow public meetings and against denials of licences to 
hold public processions. The appeals are, however, to another 
administrative authority which, although theoretically capable of a 
more strategic grasp of social problems, is not free from executive 
bias. As in the United Kingdom, the legislation does not provide for 
appeal to the courts, and a test case brought before the European 
Commission on Human Rights lends support to the conclusion that 
no such remedy is available.63 Yet, as Brownlie observed,64 there is 
no reason why courts could not review the exercise of the powers at 
issue on the basis of the 'ordinary principles of administrative law'. 
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Nevertheless, in the absence of clearly and narrowly defined criteria, 
and given the subjectively phrased legislation, an effective challenge 
to the wide discretionary powers granted to the relevant authorities 
is not a realistic prospect. 
D. Suggestions for Reform and Future Prospects 
Whether the freedom of assembly in the territory is actually abused 
by the law enforcers because of legislative loopholes cannot be 
established with sufficient certainty, yet reliance on the good faith 
and self-restraint of officials hardly provides a solid foundation for 
the protection of civil liberties. There are also grounds for the concern 
that — since public meetings and proceedings are at most 'lawful' 
within the existing legal framework — the freedom to assemble may 
be entirely abrogated if brought into conflict with a competing right 
or obligation. It is desirable, therefore, to 'carve out [for such a 
freedom] a protected status'65 or at least elevate it above 'the interstices 
of the substantive law'66 which it occupies in the Hong Kong legal 
system. This would allow it to play a greater and more definite role 
in legislative, executive, and judicial decision-making.67 
The importance of the right of assembly cannot be overemphasized. 
Indeed, as Macfarlane noted in The Theory and Practice of Human Rights: 
[t]here is a tight correlation between the existence of an effective right of 
association and assembly, exercising the associated right of freedom of 
expression and the general recognition and protection of other fundamental 
human rights. This is not surprising, since without effective and operative 
rights of association, assembly and expression ... there is no possibility of 
taking action to draw attention to and secure redress for the invasion of other 
rights.68 
Moreover, the exercise of these rights is thought, according to 
another writer, to be conducive to social stability in the light of the 
'escape valve' theory.69 Thus 'citizens who are politically active, who 
spend their energies on social protest, meeting, parading, picketing 
and petitioning are releasing the pressures of modern society before 
the revolutionary elements can reach critical mass.'70 As this writer 
concludes: 'It is surely better to have the discontented campaigning 
and litigating, perhaps achieving legal and social reform, than to sow 
the seeds of a terrorist underground.'71 Distinguished members of the 
judiciary have also recognized the 'undoubted right of Englishmen 
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to assemble together for the purpose of deliberating upon public 
grievances'.72 
The notion that such a right should find formal legislative expression 
has none the less been disputed by some legal authorities. Lord 
Scarman, for instance, considered it 'unnecessary' to enact a 'positive 
right to demonstrate' since in his opinion the right already exists, 
'subject only to limits required by the need for good order and the 
passage of traffic',73 and his position was supported by the Select 
Committee charged with the Review of the Public Order Act and 
Related Legislation.74 The extent to which the right of assembly may 
be said to exist in the above sense has, however, been questioned by 
Wallington, who regards it as tantamount to a mere perception of 
lawfulness in specific circumstances.75 
The need for and the value of codification in the context of public 
processions and meetings have been stated with particular conviction 
by Bevan. He maintains that 'a right of procession would afford the 
protester clear legal protection',76 'provide a means of regulating 
municipal controls',77 and 'bring the liberty which underlies protest 
into sharper relief and hinder the possibilities of its gradual, and 
sometimes, hidden erosion'.78 Similarly, 'a statutory right of assembly 
would force the law to recognize assembly as a legitimate usage of 
many public places'79 and allow restrictive local by-laws to be tested 
judicially.80 American courts have acknowledged such advantages,81 
and the 'right to expressive usage of public places' is firmly established 
in American legal practice.82 
Both the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 and the Basic 
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (promulgated on 4 April 1990) provide respectively 
for the 'right of peaceful assembly' and the 'freedom of assembly, 
procession and of demonstration'.83 Yet no 'preferred status' within 
the system of laws is guaranteed to the right of peaceful assembly 
under either of these constitutional documents.84 They may none the 
less raise the status of this freedom to that of a 'softer'85 legal principle 
which might shift the emphasis currently placed on public order 
objectives to the protection of civil liberties. 
Indeed, a shift in a less authoritarian direction is urged as a 
reaffirmation of democratic values in a period characterized by the 
gradual emergence of a participative culture and a quest for more 
effective communication between the grass roots periphery and the 
bureaucratic centre.86 As Baker contends: 
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When conditions and events so strongly offend people's political and ethical 
consciousness that they are moved to take non-violent, disruptive steps, the 
situation has usually become one in which it is more important for the 
community to have its normal routines broken and people's everyday activities 
disrupted in order to awaken the government and the community to the deep 
dissatisfaction, than it is for the community to avoid the inconveniences of 
the disruption.87 
Baker's view seems to apply with even greater force to contemporary 
Hong Kong society, the relative stability and homogeneous nature of 
which militate against large-scale social disruption. 
Closely related to the demand for a shift in emphasis from 
authoritarian to libertarian values, and contingent upon a greater 
recognition of the importance of the freedom of assembly within the 
legal system, is a possible reform in the allocation of the burden of 
action between those seeking to exercise this right and officials 
entrusted with the power to regulate it. Specifically, rather than 
compelling the former to challenge restrictions imposed on the freedom 
of association and assembly, the law should require the latter to 
demonstrate that such restrictions are warranted. A reform along these 
lines would, one hopes, also result in the removal of licensing, bans, 
and similar prior-control mechanisms.88 
The abolition of prior controls need not, however, entail the 
jettisoning of other means of regulation. For instance, regulation of 
the time, place, and manner of a public gathering would not amount 
to an abridgement of the freedom of assembly provided it did not 
prevent the exercise of this highly valued liberty, particularly where 
a range of equivalent channels or opportunities exists. Indeed, the 
government ought to assume the formal responsibility for ensuring 
that adequate facilities for public expression are available.89 
Needless to say, apart from restrictions pertaining to conduct and 
manner, the ordinary criminal law could also be relied upon in 
appropriate circumstances, and use could be made of specific offences 
in respect of participants in public gatherings who are personally 
involved in violations of the law while taking part in the activities of 
such societies or gatherings. However, the ambit of the relevant 
offences must be narrowly defined and strictly interpreted, and adequate 
defences ought to be built into the prohibitions thought necessary.90 
Furthermore, as a general rule the government's view should be 
informed by the 'least restrictive alternative' approach,91 and the 
authorities should be permitted to impose restrictions on the freedom 
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of assembly only when other alternatives have been exhausted or have 
proved ineffective and such a step is unavoidable in the face of serious 
public disorder, personal injury, and significant damage to or 
destruction of property. 
Protection of the citizen's right to assemble freely would none the 
less remain inadequate as long as the factors which justify the 
circumscription of this right are not meticulously defined.92 Moreover, 
law enforcement officials or judges should, in weighing such factors, 
follow a stringent test along the lines of the 'reasonableness'93 or 
'clear and present danger' criteria.94 The adoption of criteria of this 
type would arguably result in the exclusion of prohibitions on the 
freedom of assembly which are susceptible to arbitrary and 
discriminatory application and help limit restriction to cases in which 
evidence is available with respect to the seriousness and imminence 
of a social disturbance. 
Equipped with such tools the courts ought to assume a greater role 
in the protection of the freedom of assembly, using their existing 
authority to interpret the relevant statutes while giving more careful 
consideration to libertarian values than can be expected of executive 
authorities.95 The scope for judicial involvement should be extended 
through provisions allowing both the Commissioner of Police and the 
organizer of an assembly or procession to approach the courts for a 
determination as to whether such gatherings may take place.96 The 
provision of a firm basis for substantive judicial review of executive 
acts that impose restraints on the freedom of assembly would also 
reinforce the courts' position as the forum in which the individual 
can obtain redress from the excesses of government or government-
sanctioned authority. 
It is expected that Hong Kong's public order law will be amended 
to curb police powers with regard to the control of public assemblies.97 
Yet the preoccupation of both the authorities and the economic 
establishment with the twin objectives of 'prosperity' and 'stability' 
militates against any radical departures from the status quo in this 
particular domain during the transition period before 1997. Although 
there is a general recognition of the need to close legislative loopholes 
in so far as civil liberties are concerned well in advance of that critical 
date, there is perhaps an even greater reluctance in official and 
unofficial quarters to encourage individual and group activities which 
are construed as posing a challenge to the bureaucracy and detracting 
from its ability to govern efficiently. The China dimension is also 
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relevant in this context for it has been alleged that the government 
may be 'clamping down on dissent [in order] to appease Beijing'.98 
The prospects of reform will to all appearances be even poorer after 
1997. For, while the People's Republic of China seems favourably 
disposed towards the notion of capitalist Hong Kong, it will in all 
probability endeavour to place the territory's market economy within 
a more, rather than less, authoritarian political framework. Given the 
experience of Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan," the Chinese 
may not be inclined to acknowledge the existence of a strong positive 
correlation between political freedom and economic performance in 
the Asian context; in fact, there is evidence to suggest that they believe 
that the relationship between these variables tends to be negative.100 
As a corollary, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lend support, 
before as well as after 1997, to attempts to liberalize the laws 
concerning the freedom of association and assembly.101 
Nor it is just a matter of the effect of political freedom on economic 
performance. The Chinese leadership apparently subscribes to 'unitary' 
theories of the public interest (where the whole may be conceived as 
a single set of ends which pertain equally to all members of society) 
rather than 'individualistic' ones (where the ends of the plurality as 
a whole are simply the aggregate of ends entertained by individuals).102 
It may consequently experience genuine difficulties in reconciling 
itself to the idea of a political community in which individuals and 
groups are free to assemble in pursuit of objectives other than those 
of the social 'organism' of which they are a part. In other words, the 
freedom of assembly may suffer erosion because it hinges on 
philosophical assumptions which do not dovetail with the conception 
of the public good prevailing in the Mainland. 
Limited progress should not of course be equated with a retrogression 
to a less enlightened legal state. It would doubtless be inappropriate 
to leave the reader with the impression that the freedom of assembly 
will inevitably be curtailed rather than extended. The purpose of the 
note of caution sounded at the end of this chapter is not to suppress 
liberal hopes but to dispel unrealistic expectations. The objective of 
more progressive laws with respect to the right to assemble is 
achievable. Yet such laws are likely to be introduced, if at all, only 
following an intense dialogue within Hong Kong and between the 
territory and China. The freedom of assembly will have to be won. It 
will not be granted willingly by those who exercise control over the 
rights of others. 
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